Terry Trieweiler
Individual Privacy, Due Process, and Consumer Protection Opinions Authored by Terry Trieweiler
Individual Privacy
In State v. Bullock (1995), 272 Mont. 361, 901 P.2d 61, the Court was asked to decide whether the state constitutional right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures extends beyond the confines of a person's home to the area surrounding the home when the homeowner has made an effort to maintain privacy in the surrounding area. In the opinion authority by Justice Trieweiler, the Court held that because of Montana's strong tradition of respect for the right to individual privacy and because of the express provision in Montana's Constitution at Article II, section 10, protecting individual privacy, citizens of this state enjoy greater individual protection than is provided for under the federal constitution and that, therefore, in Montana a person may have an expectation of privacy in an area of land beyond the confines of his home when reasonable precautions have been taken to notify others that entry is not permitted and that under those circumstances warrantless entry by the State is not allowed.
In State v. Bullock (1995), 272 Mont. 361, 901 P.2d 61, the Court was asked to decide whether the state constitutional right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures extends beyond the confines of a person's home to the area surrounding the home when the homeowner has made an effort to maintain privacy in the surrounding area. In the opinion authority by Justice Trieweiler, the Court held that because of Montana's strong tradition of respect for the right to individual privacy and because of the express provision in Montana's Constitution at Article II, section 10, protecting individual privacy, citizens of this state enjoy greater individual protection than is provided for under the federal constitution and that, therefore, in Montana a person may have an expectation of privacy in an area of land beyond the confines of his home when reasonable precautions have been taken to notify others that entry is not permitted and that under those circumstances warrantless entry by the State is not allowed.
Consumer Protection
In Ridley v. Guarantee National Insurance Co. (1997), 286 Mont. 325, 951 P.2d 987, a passenger involved in a motor vehicle collision filed this action against the insurer of the driver of the other vehicle to determine the insurer's liability to pay the injured victim's medical expenses prior to final settlement of the case. In a case of first impression the court held in an opinion authored by Justice Trieweiler, that Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act requires an insurer to pay an injured victim's medical expenses without a complete release and prior to final settlement when liability is reasonably clear. In the opinion, Justice Trieweiler stated:
Medical expenses for even minor injuries can be devastating to a family of average income. The inability to pay them can damage credit and, as alleged in this case, sometimes preclude adequate treatment and recovery from the very injuries caused . . . . We conclude that this is not what was intended by the Montana Legislature when mandatory liability insurance laws and unfair claims practice laws were enacted.
In Ridley v. Guarantee National Insurance Co. (1997), 286 Mont. 325, 951 P.2d 987, a passenger involved in a motor vehicle collision filed this action against the insurer of the driver of the other vehicle to determine the insurer's liability to pay the injured victim's medical expenses prior to final settlement of the case. In a case of first impression the court held in an opinion authored by Justice Trieweiler, that Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act requires an insurer to pay an injured victim's medical expenses without a complete release and prior to final settlement when liability is reasonably clear. In the opinion, Justice Trieweiler stated:
Medical expenses for even minor injuries can be devastating to a family of average income. The inability to pay them can damage credit and, as alleged in this case, sometimes preclude adequate treatment and recovery from the very injuries caused . . . . We conclude that this is not what was intended by the Montana Legislature when mandatory liability insurance laws and unfair claims practice laws were enacted.
Due Process
In Plumb v. The Fourth Judicial District (1996), 279 Mont. 363, 927 P.2d 1011, the Court was asked to decide the constitutionality of a legislative enactment which allowed defendants in civil suits to reduce their own liability for damages claimed by an injured party by shifting responsibility to persons not named in the suit who had no opportunity to appear and defend themselves. In an opinion authored by Justice Trieweiler the court held that the legislature's purpose to apportion liability for damages based on the degree of a party's fault is a legitimate objective but that permitting a defendant to blame someone who is not present to defend him - or herself is not rationally related to that objective and that the statutory scheme, therefore, violates the rights of injured parties and the unnamed defendants to substantive due process. Therefore, the named defendant was not permitted to blame the injured party's damages on that party's physician who was not a party to the lawsuit nor able to defend himself. The opinion stated:
The 1995 amendments to §27-1-703, MCA (1987), permit the Mall to assign liability for the Plumbs' damages to Dr. Timothy Adams without affording Dr. Adams an opportunity to defend himself. As a result, Dr. Adams' professional reputation and economic interests are jeopardized without an opportunity to personally appear on his own behalf, cross-examine those witnesses who might criticize the care he provided, or offer evidence in support of his course of treatment. The percentage of liability assigned to Dr. Adams following this kind of process would not be a reliable or accurate apportionment of liability and cannot, therefore, be rationally related to the objectives for which
Senate Bill 212's supporters contend that the 1995 amendments were enacted.
Plumb, 279 Mont. at 377.
In Plumb v. The Fourth Judicial District (1996), 279 Mont. 363, 927 P.2d 1011, the Court was asked to decide the constitutionality of a legislative enactment which allowed defendants in civil suits to reduce their own liability for damages claimed by an injured party by shifting responsibility to persons not named in the suit who had no opportunity to appear and defend themselves. In an opinion authored by Justice Trieweiler the court held that the legislature's purpose to apportion liability for damages based on the degree of a party's fault is a legitimate objective but that permitting a defendant to blame someone who is not present to defend him - or herself is not rationally related to that objective and that the statutory scheme, therefore, violates the rights of injured parties and the unnamed defendants to substantive due process. Therefore, the named defendant was not permitted to blame the injured party's damages on that party's physician who was not a party to the lawsuit nor able to defend himself. The opinion stated:
The 1995 amendments to §27-1-703, MCA (1987), permit the Mall to assign liability for the Plumbs' damages to Dr. Timothy Adams without affording Dr. Adams an opportunity to defend himself. As a result, Dr. Adams' professional reputation and economic interests are jeopardized without an opportunity to personally appear on his own behalf, cross-examine those witnesses who might criticize the care he provided, or offer evidence in support of his course of treatment. The percentage of liability assigned to Dr. Adams following this kind of process would not be a reliable or accurate apportionment of liability and cannot, therefore, be rationally related to the objectives for which
Senate Bill 212's supporters contend that the 1995 amendments were enacted.
Plumb, 279 Mont. at 377.
